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Abstract
The Constitutional Court of Indonesia, in its judgment No 2-3/PUU—V/2007, 
ruled that non-Indonesian citizens have no legal standing to file judicial review 
before the Court. In determining the legal standing, the Court rejected applicants’ 
constitutional loss which should actually serve as the substantial examination 
in judicial review but rather addressed this question on the basis of applicant’s 
citizenship. This inadmissibility ruling, however, raises question on what legal 
standing actually mean in the context of judicial review. This paper reviews 
the Court’s consideration in determining legal standing status and examines 
future legal consequences of such reasoning. By revisiting the substance of legal 
standing and judicial review derived from the 1945 Constitution, relevant Statutes, 
Court’s practices and case law, as well as the dissenting opinion of the judges 
in this case, it is found that the Court overruled the substance to procedural 
examination on the basis of citizenship and therefore failed to address the actual 
question of legal standing. This paper concludes that the Court’s reasoning has 
abandoned the constitutional loss as the very substance of legal standing and to 
which amounts to immunity of legal standing provision from a judicial review. 
Consequently, non-Indonesian citizens will never be recognized in judicial review 
mechanism before the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the 23rd of October 2007, the Indonesian Constitution Court (hereinafter 
“the Court”) had rendered a decision upon judicial review submission registered 
under the Judgment No 2-3/PUU—V/2007. It was then delivered a week later in 
a trial hearing on Tuesday, dated on the 30th of October 2007. The substance of 
the case questioned the legality of death penalty that was in force under article 
80 (1) (a); article 80 (2) (a); article 80 (3) (a); article 81 (3) (a); article 82 (1) (a); 
article 82 (2) (a); article 82 (3) (a) of the Indonesian Statute No 22 Year 1997 
on Narcotics towards the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.1 Two 
Indonesians and three Australian citizens filed for judicial review before the 
Constitutional Court, challenging the legality of death penalty in force under 
the Narcotics Law. The first two Indonesians were Edith Yunita Sianturi and 
Rani Andriani, while the three Australians were Myuran Sukumaran, Andrew 
Chan and Scott Anthony Rush.2 All of them were convicted by the public court 
for capital punishment under the aforementioned law. Although the merit of 
their judicial review was rejected by the Constitutional Court, however, this case 
is considered as one of the most influential precedents for the Constitutional 
Court in determining forthcoming cases.3 This became the first case before the 
Constitutional Court filed by non-Indonesian citizens.4 
The judgment declared that the case was admissible before the Constitutional 
Court but for the Indonesian applicants. They were granted to file judicial review 
under article 51 (1) (a) of the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning 
the Constitutional Court stating that the applicants shall be Indonesian citizens. 
There were not much questions with regards to the application of this article for 
1  Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution, No. 2–3/PUU–V/2007 (The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2007).
2  Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 1–2.
3  See, inter alia, Judicial Review Number 1 of 1979 on Extradition, No. 73/PUU-VIII/2010 (The Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Indonesia 2010). See Judicial Review Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court as it has 
been amended into Law Number 8 of 2011 on the Amendment of Law Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional 
Court against the 1945 Constitution, No. 137/PUU-XII/2014 (The Constitutional Court of ther Republic of Indonesia 
2014).
4  In 2011, four years later after the Judgment No 2-3/PUU—V/2007 delivered, the Constitution Court has unanimously 
rendered a Judgment No 73/PUU-VIII/2010 filed also by non-Indonesian citizen, a Romanian, Popa Nicolae, concerning 
on his arbitrary detention of article 34 (b), article 35 (1), and article 39 (4) of the Indonesian Statute No 1 Year 
1979 on Extradition and article 51 (1) (a) the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitutional Court declared the case inadmissible as the applicant had no legal standing to file for 
such judicial review.
A Commentary: the Inadmissibility of Non-Indonesian Citizens in Judicial Review before the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, December 2017, Volume 3, Number 2210
the Indonesian citizens. The Court then examined the merit of judicial review 
for those Indonesian applicants and found to reject the case. On the other 
hand the Court declared that the case was inadmissible for the three Australian 
citizens. The Court found that they were not entitled to submit judicial review 
under the same article. This decision separated the Chambers’ opinion into six 
to three in terms of applicants’ legal standing.5
1.1 The Applicants Submissions
The Australian citizens proclaimed that article 51 (1) (a) of the Indonesian 
Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court was not in compliance 
with the Indonesian Constitutional Court 1945.6 They further argued that they 
should have standing before the Court on the basis of these eight following 
grounds: i) the applicable regime of human rights law in the 1945 Constitution; 
ii) non-discrimination principle; iii) and the equality before the law as afforded 
by the 1945 Constitution; iv) the definition of constitutional loss; v) due process 
of law; vi) the threshold vii) the practice of other constitutional courts; viii) and 
the gravity of the rights and sentence.
First of all, they argued that the wording of “each person” adopted in the 
1945 Constitution shall refer to human rights law regime, leaving the concept 
of citizenship and nationality.7 They claimed that article 51 (1) (a) which differs 
on the basis of citizenship was not in accordance with the 1945 Constitution. 
The 1945 Constitution provided that each person is subjected for human rights 
protection as long as he/she lives within Indonesia territory. This was confirmed by 
Article 26 (2) of the 1945 Constitution when defining resident as both Indonesian 
citizens and non-Indonesians who are within Indonesia territory, regardless its 
citizenship or nationality.8 
Another point was raised relating to the principle of non-discrimination 
before the law. They made reference to article 28D (1) of the 1945 Constitution, 
stating that each person is entitled to be equally treated before the law without 
5  Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 432.
6   Ibid., 15.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid., 16.
A Commentary: the Inadmissibility of Non-Indonesian Citizens in Judicial Review before the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, December 2017, Volume 3, Number 2 211
any discrimination. Consequently, the constitutional loss defined in article 51 (1) 
may occur to either Indonesian citizens or non-Indonesian citizens,9 or in other 
words to each person regardless its citizenship or nationality as long as he/she 
is afforded constitutional rights under the 1945 Constitution.10 
They further recalled the applicable hierarchy in the Indonesian legal 
system, which placed statutes as the manifestation of the 1945 Constitution. 
Subsequently, the protection of rights set forth under the statutes rooted from 
the 1945 Constitution shall also apply to both Indonesian and non-Indonesian 
citizens. There would be then inconsistency and contradiction to argue that the 
rights afforded by the 1945 Constitution apply exclusively to Indonesian citizens. 
If it is true that the 1945 Constitution and the rights set forth therein are reserved 
exclusively to Indonesian citizens, then statutes, that are the manifestation 
of the 1945 Constitution, shall be reserved merely for its citizens and not be 
applicable to non-Indonesian citizens. In this sense, they (Australian citizens) 
simply could not be prosecuted under the concerned statute.11 Moreover, instead 
of “each person”, the term of “each citizen” should have been adopted in the 1945 
Constitution if it is intended and applied exclusively for Indonesian citizens.12
They also reiterated that under article 24 (1) and 24 (1) (a) of the 1945 
Constitution, judicial power is mandated to the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court. Referring to those aforementioned articles, due process 
of law in seeking justice may also stand before the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court of Indonesia. It goes saying to prove that each person, 
regardless its citizenship and nationality, is entitled to seek justice by means legal 
proceedings before Supreme Court and/or the Constitutional Court. It constituted 
breach of constitutional right when the Constitutional Court rejected judicial 
review by non-Indonesian citizens on the basis of citizenship or nationality.
They proposed certain conditions to what extent non-Indonesian citizens 
may exercise for judicial review. They argued that judicial review should be 
9  Ibid., 16–18.
10  Ibid., 18–19.
11  Ibid., 18.
12  Ibid.
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granted to non-Indonesian citizens, when non-Indonesian citizens become the 
subject of a statute and when the statutes concern with the fundamental rights 
that inherent to each individual regardless its citizenship and nationality.13 
Providing the practice of Germany, Mongolia and Australia constitutional court 
which grant legal standing for non-nationals to file for judicial review before 
their constitutional courts, the applicants sought for similar approach to be 
adopted by the Court in their case.14 Lastly, the gravity of the sentence itself was 
the self-evident and argued as one of the grounds for the legal standing of the 
applicants. The verdict of capital punishment had shown that they (Australian 
citizens) were having interest for such judicial review in this case.15
1.2 The Chamber’s Opinion
In its judgment No 2-3/PUU—V/2007, the Chamber recalled to article 51 (1) 
of the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court 
in addressing the question of legal standing of the applicants. In enforcing this 
article, the Court referred to its judgment No 006/PUU-III/2005 concerning the 
conditions of which the claim for constitutional loss could be exercised.16 The 
Court ruled that in order to establish constitutional loss, the applicants shall 
satisfy these five following requirements cumulatively.17 First, that the applicant 
possesses the constitutional rights and/or authorities as proscribed under the 
1945 Constitution. Second, the applicant considers his or her constitutional 
rights and/or authorities have been deprived by the challenged statute. Third, 
such constitutional deprival or loss should be specific and actual or imminently 
potential, on the basis of logical order is likely to occur. Fourth, there should 
be a causal verband or causality between the loss and the enactment of the 
concerned statute. Fifth, there should be the possibility when a favorable court 
decision is rendered, the constitutional loss would not occur or repeated.
13  Ibid., 19–20.
14  Ibid., 20.
15  Ibid.,95.
16  Ibid.,367. See Judicial Review Number 32 of 2004 on Regional Government against the 1945 Constitution, No. 
006/PUU-III/2005 (The Constitutional Court 2005). 
17  Ibid. See Judicial Review Number 56 Prp of 1960 on the Determination of Agricultural Land Area against the 1945 
Constitution, No. 11/PUU-V/2007 (The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 2007). Those aforemen-
tioned requirements are cumulative; meaning that all of those five conditions must be fulfilled in establishing 
constitutional loss.
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The Court found that the two Indonesian citizens possessed the constitutional 
rights proscribed under article 28A and 28I (1) of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution 
regarding the right to life.18 The Chamber believed that the rights derived from 
those aforementioned articles are non-derogable rights. It proclaimed that the 
enactment of the death penalty under the Law of Narcotics could possibly be 
considered as an actual loss to them.19 The Chamber also found that these two 
Indonesian citizens have satisfied the requirement of article 51 (1), specifically 
in point (a) which states that the applicant shall be Indonesian citizen. In this 
regards, the Court granted legal standing for these two Indonesian citizens 
and declared their submission was admissible for judicial review before the 
Constitution Court.
However, the Court did not grant legal standing when examining the 
applicants of the three Australian citizens. The Court held its finding on these 
three following grounds: i) that article 51 (1) expressis verbis or clearly states 
that grants solely for Indonesian citizens to file for the judicial review before 
the Constitutional Court; ii) the inadmissibility of non-Indonesian citizens to 
examine the laws does not necessarily means that they do not have legal protection 
under the principle of due process of law, in this case they could resort for 
appeal, cassation and review before the supreme court; iii) the wording of each 
person and group of people with similar interest in the official explanation of 
this provision must be interpreted in connection with the individual Indonesian 
citizens, thus, the applicants were not qualified under article 51 (1). As they had 
no legal standing before the Constitutional Court,20 the case was then declared 
inadmissible.
1.3 The Dissenting Opinions 
With regards to the merit of the case on the legality of the death penalty, 
the Judges’ opinions have been divided into five to four. There were four Judges 
submitted their dissenting opinions, where three of them addressed their 
dissenting views with regards to the legal standing of the applicants.
18  Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 367.
19   Ibid.
20   Ibid., 367–68.
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One of the dissenting judges, Justice Harjono, argued that the wording of 
the constitutional rights as proscribed under article 28A to 28J in the Indonesian 
Constitution 1945 adopted the term of “each person”. This adoption implies that 
the recognition of the rights is entitled to individual, including to non-Indonesian 
citizens, regardless their citizenships and nationalities.21 Nevertheless, this should 
not mean that non-Indonesian citizens vis a vis possess the same treatment and 
have the same rights22. He argued that there must be certain limitations on the 
application. Under the Indonesian legal system, he claimed, the laws could be 
differentiated into these three following types. First, the laws that are intended 
exclusively to Indonesian citizens. Non-Indonesian citizens would simply have 
no legal standing to challenge the first laws. Second, the laws are designated 
merely to non-Indonesian citizens. These laws may reflect as sovereignty and 
supremacy of a state, including its policies towards non-Indonesian citizens. They 
might be granted legal standing to challenge on this second laws, but it would 
be likely unsuccessful because it relates to state sovereignty and supremacy. 
And third, the laws that are implemented for both Indonesian citizens and 
non-Indonesian citizens. When non-Indonesian citizens challenge this third 
type of laws, it will rule both Indonesian citizens and non-Indonesian citizens, 
and the result of such examination would be concrete and genuinely affectted 
both parties.23 He acknowledged that the constitutional court judgment is erga 
omnes in nature. Once the Court has declared that a law does not bind legally, 
the Court ruling shall not apply exclusively for the applicants whom their rights 
have been deprived, but it shall apply to all Indonesian citizens. Therefore, when 
there is an application before the Constitutional Court filed by non-Indonesian 
citizens to examine the substance of the laws that might impact to the Indonesian 
citizens, they should be then granted the legal standing.24 
He further argued that the effect of such inadmissibility would delay the 
legality of law because it had to wait for qualified parties, by means Indonesian 
21  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Harjanto in Constitutional Court Judgment on the Legality of Death Penalty under 
the Law of  Narcotics (n 1) at 434
22  Ibid., 434
23  Ibid., 434-435
24  Ibid., 435
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citizens, who have the interest to file such examination.25 Instead of annulling 
the application of article 51 (1), he suggested the Court to adopt a broader view 
to the application of this article26, granting the standing to non-Indonesian 
citizens. Such argumentation showed genuine spirit of the original notion of 
judicial review. 
Justice HM. Laica Marzuki, in his dissenting opinion, argued that if one 
strictly referred to article 51 (1) (a) then the right for judicial review would not 
be granted to non-Indonesian citizens. He noted, however, when the substance 
of the judicial review is in connection with the right to life of any individual 
proscribed under article 28A and 28I in the Indonesian Constitution 1945 then 
article 51 (1) (a) could be overruled.27 He reiterated that article 51 (1) (a) could not 
prevent the examination because it was a question of life and death concerning 
the right to life as an absolute right and inherent dignity of human being. He then 
contended that article 28D (1) of the 1945 Constitution ensures equal treatment 
for each person before the law. The meaning of “each person” article 28D (1) 
of the 1945 Constitution shall not exclusively refer to the concept citizen right; 
indeed, it is equal right for each person who lives within Indonesia territory.28 
He further provided example of the constitution judgments on legal standing 
filed by non-Germany citizens and non-Mongolia citizens, and even stateless 
individual who illegally lived within the territory of Mongolia, were declared 
admissible by Germany Constitution Court and Mongolian Constitutional Court 
respectively.29
A similar interpretation adopted by Justice Maruarar Siahaan in examining 
the request of judicial review by three Australian citizens. He held that the 
adoption of human rights into the Indonesian Constitution 1945 as the basic 
norm implies that human rights serve as the threshold in examining legality 
of laws towards the constitution. In so doing, the constitutional rights afforded 
25  Ibid., 435-436
26  Ibid.
27  Dissenting Opinion of Justice HM. Laica Marzuki in Constitutional Court Judgment on the Legality of Death Penalty 
under the Law of  Narcotics (n 1) at 442-443.
28  Ibid., 443
29  Ibid.
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by article 51 (1) (a) shall not solely apply nationally but also universally.30 He 
recalled article 28 I (2) of the Indonesian Constitution 1945 which ensures non-
discriminative treatment to each person. 
Furthermore, the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) by the Republic of Indonesia on the 28th of October 2005 
as embodied under the Indonesian Statute No 12 Year 2005 shall point human 
rights to serve as one of decisive factors in judicial review. Consequently, legal 
standing on this case shall be expanded to non-Indonesian citizens when the 
substance of judicial review related to fundamental rights.31
However, he then provided for limitation of under what circumstance non-
Indonesian citizens shall not have rights to question state policies concerning 
on citizenship. He referred to the Constitution of the Republic India which 
differentiates the Fundamental Rights into these two: exclusively applicable 
for Indian citizens and for each person including non-Indian citizens.32 This 
inferred that notwithstanding the wording of “each person” is hold under the 
Indonesian Constitution 1945, the rights possessed between Indonesian citizens 
and non-Indonesian citizens should be also easily differentiated. For instance, 
inter alia, in the political rights, the rights for election and to be elected that 
are embodied in the Indonesian Constitution 1945 shall apply exclusively for 
Indonesian citizens, and certainly not for non-Indonesian citizens. The court 
practices would assist to differentiate between the fundamental rights entitled 
for Indonesian citizens and the fundamental rights for non-Indonesian citizens 
that are guaranteed by the Indonesian legal system and its proceedings.33 Lastly, 
he emphasized that unsystematic law or its disorder tends to occur within legal 
system because the laws are made in different times. It is then left to the judges 
to interpret the laws reflecting the spirit of the constitution so that it could be 
implemented in logical and systematical order.34
30  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maruarar Siahaan in Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 
1945 Constitution at 446. It reviews the Legality of Death Penalty.
31  Ibid., 446-447
32  Ibid., 448
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid.,450-451
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II. THE COMMENTARY
It has already been discussed on the previous chapter how the Court ruled 
the question of legal standing to non-Indonesian citizens in judicial review before 
the Constitution Court of Indonesia. This chapter goes further to determine the 
actual question of legal standing under article 51 (1) of the Indonesian Statute No 
24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court. Departing from this starting 
point, this chapter notes the inconsistency revealed from the Court reasoning, 
as well as the conflict of laws arising from the Court’s finding.
2.1 Legal Standing before the Indonesian Constitutional Court: Procedure 
Vs Substance
Before turning to discuss the procedural and substantive examinations of legal 
standing in the Indonesian Constitutional Court, it would be necessary to see 
what the genuine reasons, purposes and position of legal standing examination 
in the court proceedings are, and to briefly look at the notion of legal standing 
itself. It is not questioned here, however, that the position of legal standing as 
the preliminary examination before the Court goes for the merits. 
Generally speaking, (legal) standing is defined as “preliminary jurisdictional 
requirement, formulated at a high level of generality and applied across the 
entire domain of law”.35 It is more jurisdictional determination rather than 
determination on the substance36 as the latter will amount to trial hearing. The 
examination of standing, as noted by William A. Fletcher, is intended to ensure 
that the (possibly) injured applicants could present the case effectively, able to 
make complaint or questioning the issue, that his/her case would inform the 
court for the consequence of its decisions, to control policy making functions37 
and in practical, to control the Court’s “appellate docket”.38 In addition to those, 
it is important to note that another purpose of standing is in order to avoid the 
overlapping jurisdiction between the Court and other governmental branches.39
35  William Flethcer, “The Structure of Standing,” The Yale Law Journal 98, no. 221 (1988).
36  Ibid., 229
37  Ibid., 222
38  Ibid., 228
39  Stefanus Hendrianto, “Convergence or Borrowing: Standing in the Indonesian Constitutional Court,” Constitutional 
Review 1, no. 1 (2015): 41–42.
A Commentary: the Inadmissibility of Non-Indonesian Citizens in Judicial Review before the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, December 2017, Volume 3, Number 2218
The ruling of legal standing enshrines under article 56 (1) and 56 (2) of the 
Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court. Article 
56 (1) and (2) respectively read:
Article 56
(1) When the Court finds that the applicant or/and his/her submissions does not 
satisfy the requirements as stipulated by article 50 and 51, the Court shall 
declare that the case is inadmissible
(2) When the Court finds that the submission is reasonable, the Court shall declare 
that the case is admissible.
The Court may declare the case inadmissible when the applicants or their 
submissions do not satisfy the requirements of, inter alia, the legal standing as 
stipulated by article 51 in the same statute. However, pursuant to article 56 (2), 
the Court shall declare the case admissible when it finds reasonable basis in 
applicants submissions. It would be then correct to state that question on legal 
standing serves as preliminary examination before the Court goes to examine 
merit of the case40 in the context of entire trial proceedings. There is nothing to 
suggest that such preliminary examination denotes as procedural determination. 
The Court, however, seemed to indicate these two to be similar. It was shown 
when the Court relied on the expressis verbis of article 51 (1).41 It was quite clear 
here that the Court considered more procedural examination on legal standing, 
leaving the question of possible constitutional loss of the applicants. The wording 
from George P Fletcher would seem appropriate to describe such approach that 
the procedural rules determine “the way game is played, and the game is always 
played the same way”.42
However, such procedural determination is criticized, that at certain extent, 
would leave the actual nature of the problem. William A Fletcher suggested that 
in determining whether applicants have legal standing, the genuine question is 
whether the applicants have the rights to enforce the “asserted legal duty”. The 
actual question of legal standing lies on the merit of the case. He argued that 
40  Conf Bisariyadi, “Membedah Doktrin Kerugian Konstitusional,” Jurnal Konstitusi 14, no. 1 (2017): 39. It argues that 
due to the inconsistence application of the Court with regards to constitutional loss’ doctrine, the inadmissibility 
or niet onvankelijk verklaard decision may also be rendered by the Court when it concerns the examination of the 
merit.
41 Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 367–68.
42 George Flethcer, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8.
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the interest protected by the laws is the same standard applied both to show 
that the applicants have the standing and consecutively to which the basis 
they rely their claims on the merit of the case.43 Condemning the standing 
as procedural matter at the first place would leave the nature of the problem 
unresolved. Reflecting at this line of argument, he then concluded that the 
question of standing is the question of substantive law and consequently the 
answer of the standing questions would depend on the substantive of the laws.44 
This ‘substance examination approach’ on legal standing is what precisely Justice 
Harjono, Justice Maruarar Siahaan and Justice HM. Laica Marzuki held in their 
respective dissenting opinions. As the examination concerns the substantive laws 
(non-derogable rights) proscribed under the 1945 Constitution, the procedural 
questions could be simply overruled. 
Indeed, in legal standing determination, such substantive approach seems 
to be more compelling with the construction of article 51 (1) and its following 
five requirements set by the Court in judgment No 006/PUU-III/2005. Article 
51 (1) of the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional 
Court, defines the parties entitled to exercise judicial review. It is read as follows:
(1) Applicant is the party who considers that his/her constitutional right or authority 
has been deprived by the enactment of statute, namely:
a. Individual Indonesian citizens;
b. Customary community groups living in accordance with the society 
development and principles of the State of the Republic of Indonesia as 
provided by the laws;
c. Public or private legal entities; or 
d. State institutions
43  Some commentators noted that this would be the same question addressed by the Court in determining legal 
standing and the merit of the case. See, inter alia, Flethcer, “The Structure of Standing,” 236. It would be odd 
when the Court granted the admissibility of the case but later rejected the case in the examination of the merit, 
because the same standard applied to both in determining the legal standing and merit of the case, there is over-
lapping standard applied for both examinations. See also Bisariyadi, “Membedah Doktrin Kerugian Konstitusional,” 
38. However, the admissibility test does not work that way. When looking at the nature of legal standing under 
article 56 (1) of the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning Indonesian Constitutional Court, it would be 
seen that legal standing stands as procedural matter within court proceedings. Indeed, the threshold employed 
in determining between such procedural context and substance would not be the identical. In the context of 
procedural examination of legal standing for instance, the threshold applied by the Court is “reasonable basis 
to believe” (article 56 (2)). It is in fact the preliminary examination that there are possible constitutional losses 
possessed by the applicants.
44 Flethcer, “The Structure of Standing,” 225, 290–91. He argued that the doctrine of legal standing is the result of 
the overlapping development of the administrative state and the litigation to enforce public and primarily consti-
tutional values. See also Philipus Hadjon, Pengantar Hukum Administrasi Indonesia-Introduction to the Indonesian 
Administrative Law 3rd Edition (Surabaya: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1994), 335.
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In order to determine the ratio legis45 or substance of an article, it can be 
easily identified that the substance is usually able to serve independently the 
article without requiring any other clauses. On the contrary, procedural cannot 
stand by itself in an article. When looking at the formulation of article 51 (1), 
one may easily find that this article comprises of substantive elements defining 
the applicants and its required pre-condition, and procedural elements providing 
list of subjected parties who are able to bring the judicial review. Without the 
procedural elements of the list parties, the article yet able to stand although it 
solely comprises with the definition of applicants and constitutional loss.
The first element of this provision, suggested as the substance, defines the 
parties who consider that their constitutional rights and/or authorities have been 
deprived by the enactment of statutes. It refers into pre-conditional requirements 
of possible constitutional injury. There is no mention to what constitute 
constitutional rights are. In order to determine the scope of constitutional rights 
and/or authorities, one should look at the official explanation of article 51 of the 
Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court. The 
explanation defines the terms of ‘constitutional rights’. Pursuant to its official 
explanation, the meaning of constitutional right shall refer to the rights that 
proscribed under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. 
Article 51 (1) further rules that such constitutional rights should be considered 
for being deprived by the enactment of statute. In other words, this article 
governs that the applicants should demonstrate the possible constitutional 
loss. Meanwhile in order to define constitutional loss, the Court recalls its 
judgment No 006/PUU-III/2005 which specifically addresses the requirements of 
constitutional loss.46 Constitutional loss could be established when it satisfy these 
five cumulative conditions. First of all, the applicant shall have the constitutional 
rights and/or authorities proscribed under the 1945 Constitution. Second, the 
45 Satjipto Rahardjo, Ilmu Hukum, 6th ed. (Bandung: Citra Aditya Bakti, 2006), 45. He believed that each legal 
instrument has ratio legis, the basic principle of law underlying the instruments or also known as the spirit in the 
legal instruments.
46 This set of requirements is arguably rooted from the case requirement of article III of the United States Constitution, 
to which requiring the applicants to show the injury in fact; the causality between the injury and the challenged 
statute; and the redressability sought. See also Hendrianto, “Convergence or Borrowing: Standing in the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court,” 33. ; Bisariyadi, “Membedah Doktrin Kerugian Konstitusional,” 27.
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applicant believes that his or her constitutional rights and/or authorities have 
been deprived by the challenged statute. Third, such constitutional deprival or 
loss should be specific and actual or imminently potential to occur on the basis of 
logical order. Fourth, that there should be a causal verband or causality between 
the loss and the enactment of the concerned statute. Lastly, there should be the 
possibility when a favorable court decision is rendered, the constitutional loss 
would not occur or repeated.47
The formulation of article 51 (1) mentions list of four subjects who are able 
to submit judicial review before the Court. Nevertheless, such determination 
seems to be more supportive in nature, cannot stand by itself and therefore 
serves rather as procedural matters than substantive one. According to this 
second element, there are four subjects entitled to enforce judicial review, 
namely individual, including the group of people who possess the same interest,48 
Indonesian citizens; customary community groups living in accordance with the 
society development and principles of the State of the Republic of Indonesia 
as provided by the laws; public or private legal entities; and State institutions. 
If this logical formulation is affirmed, it seems then that the three dissenting 
judges relied on substantive part of article 51 in determining the actual question 
of legal standing, meanwhile the Court decision emphasized that the question 
of legal standing lies on the procedural matters
2.2 Inconsistency in the Chamber’s Opinion
The Chamber’s found the case was inadmissible for three Australian citizens 
on these three following grounds. First, that article 51 (1) (a) expressis verbis or 
has stated clearly that it is Indonesian citizens solely, in terms of citizenship, 
who are able to file for judicial review before the Constitutional Court. Second, 
the inadmissibility of non-Indonesian citizens to examine the laws does not 
necessarily mean that they loss their legal protections under the principle of 
due process of law, in this case they were granted the legal remedies of appeal, 
cassation and review before the supreme court. Third, that the wording of “each 
47 Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 367–68. It is about on the Legality 
of Death Penalty under the Law of  Narcotics.
48 Official Explanation of article 51 (1) (a) of “Indonesian Law Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court” (2003).
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person and group of people with similar interest”, as stipulated in its official 
explanation of the statute, must be interpreted in connection with the individual 
Indonesian citizens.49 
2.2.1 The Expressis Verbis of Article 51 (1) (a)
In determining the legal standing, the Court argued that article 51 (1) (a) 
of the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court 
expressis verbis stated that Indonesian citizens are solely entitled to file for judicial 
review.50 The Court limited its argumentation on the basis of its expressis verbis 
of the concerned article. As mentioned in the previous sub chapter, article 51 
(1) (a) serves as the procedural part of article 51. Briefly speaking, the Court 
answered the question of legal standing of the applicants by stating that because 
the rules say so.
It is true when the Court resorted to expressis verbis of article 51 (1) (a), 
then the Australian citizens simply do not fall within the scope of this article. 
This, however, does not seem to be correct examination in addressing questions 
of legal standing. To what extent such procedural argumentation is legitimate 
in determining legal standing status? It is essential here to recall the nature of 
judicial review.
The hierarchy of the norms of the Stufenbaulehre Theory51 has significantly 
affected into Indonesian legal system. This theory states that the norms have 
the hierarchy of different levels, and they are not standing side by side on the 
same level. It must constitute a unity between the norms, in which Hans Kelsen 
emphasizes “that the creation of one norm, the lower one, is determined by the 
higher and terminated by a highest, the basic norm, which being the supreme 
reason of validity of the whole legal order”.52 In Indonesian legal system, the 
concrete evidence of a hierarchical legal order is in force under article 7 of 
the Indonesian Statute No 12 Year 2001 concerning the Establishment of the 
49 Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 367–68.
50 Ibid.
51 The Stufenbaulehre Theory or known as Teori Stufenbau in Indonesian legal system, developed by Hans Kelsen, is 
arguably initiated by and drawn from Hans Kelsen’s disciple, Adolf Julius Merkl in his article Das doppelte recht-
santlitz. See Jakab Andras, European Constitutional Language (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 326.
52 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (20th Century Legal Philosophy Series Vol. I) (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1949), 124.
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Regulations. The type and the hierarchical order of the Indonesian regulations 
consist of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia; MPR Decisions;53 
Laws/Government Regulations in lieu of law;54 Executive Regulations; Presidential 
Regulations; Provincial Government Regulations; and Regional/Municipal 
Government Regulations. This theory, however, has also reiterated that in practice 
there is no guarantee that the lower norms would be in compliance with the 
higher one.55 In order to constitute such unity, it is required for ‘check and 
balance’ in legal system by means, inter alia, the judicial review.56 Reflecting on 
these circumstances, it is then fundamental for the existence of judicial review 
in legal system, although the concept and definition of judicial review itself vary 
from each state to another. Nevertheless, among those different practices between 
states, it could be derived that judicial review may refer to the examination of 
the legal instruments by the court.57 
Under the Indonesian legal system, the term of judicial review refers into 
these two meanings, i) the examination of whether a law is in compliance with 
the constitution;58 ii) and/or that the rules or legal instruments, -inferior than 
the law in a hierarchical system, is in accordance with the law.59 The first falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Constitution Court, while the latter is 
mandated to the Supreme Court. Judicial review (in this context is constitutional 
review) before the Constitutional Court, has its purpose to examine the legality 
of the laws towards the Indonesian Constitution 1945 mandated by article 24C (1) 
of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, article 10 (1) (a) of the Indonesian Statute 
No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court and article 29 (1) (a) of 
the Indonesian Statute No 48 Year 2009 concerning Judicial Power.  
53  MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) refers as the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic Indonesia.
54  Although the regulation in lieu of law is first initiated by the President (executive), nevertheless, it shall, be sub-
mitted, at the closest hearing, before the House of Representatives of the Republic Indonesia for the approval, 
or rejection.
55  Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2nd German Edition Max Knight). (New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange, Ltd, 
2005), 205–6. See also also the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maruarar Siahaan in Judicial Review Number 22 of 
1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 446. It explains the Legality of Death Penalty under the Law 
of Narcotics
56 King Faisal Sulaiman, Teori Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Dan Aspek Pengujiannya (Yogyakarta: Thafa Media, 
2017), 103.
57  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Hukum Acara Pengujian Undang-Undang (Jakarta: Konstitusi Pers, 2006), 1.
58  Article 24C(1) of “The  1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia” (1945).; artivle 10(1)(a) of Indonesian Law 
Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court.; and Article 29(1)(a) of “Indonesian Law Number 48 of 2009 on 
Judicial Power” (2009).
59  Article 29 (1) (a) of the Indonesian 20 (2) (b) Indonesian Law Number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power.
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Referring to the aforementioned nature of judicial review before the 
Constitutional Court, it can be drawn that statutes are subjected to examination 
towards the 1945 Constitution. Such examination is intended to check whether 
concerned statute is in compliance with the 1945 Constitution. In this regards, it 
would be then clear that the 1945 Constitution serves as the threshold for statutes 
examination.60 It would be misleading for referring to other statutes in statute 
examination. It is considered as error of law when the Court adjudicated the 
question of legal standing of non-Indonesian citizens simply from the expressis 
verbis of article 51 (1) (a). This would be examining a statute towards the statute 
instead of the constitution. 
In fact, if it is true that the 1945 Constitution and the rights set forth 
therein are reserved exclusively to Indonesian citizens, then statutes, that are 
the manifestation of the 1945 Constitution, shall be reserved exclusively for its 
citizens and not be applicable to non-Indonesian citizens. Accordingly, they 
simply could not be prosecuted under the concerned statute at the first place. 
This indicated court’s error of law when it relied on procedural matter of article 
51 (1). Indeed, the question of legal standing relied by the non-Indonesian citizens 
upon article 51 (1) (a) should be subjected first for preliminary examination by 
the Court in order to check the compliance of the concerned article towards the 
1945 Constitution before determining the status of legal standing. Alternatively, 
the Court may also consider a more lenient approach suggested by Justice 
Harjono. Rather than declaring article 51 (1) unconstitutional, the Court may 
adopt a broader interpretation stipulating that the non-Indonesian citizens’ 
applicants should fall within the course of article 51 (1) as a consequence of the 
1945 Constitution application.61 Thus, the wording of article 51 (1) (a) is not per 
se a self-evident.
The Court argument of expressis verbis, however, has abandoned the ratio 
legis, the very substance, or the genuine meaning of article 51 (1). When the 
Court adopted procedural examination to determine status on legal standing, it 
60  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maruarar Siahaan in Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 
1945 Constitution at 446.
61  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Harjanto, Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Consti-
tution at 435–36.
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implies that there must be specific rules of procedure to be satisfied. It appears 
there is nothing error with this approach. In fact, this is concrete evidence of 
Gustav Radbruch long standing theory of law. According to Radbruch, there are 
three basic principles underlying the law, namely justice, utility and certainty. 
This theory is also known for its tense situation between those three main 
principles, called as the spannungverhältnis.62 It states when one hold the law 
for its certainty, there must be lack either to justice or utility of law on the other 
side. The same thing when the Court adopted its expressis verbis reasoning in this 
case. The Court seemed to hold for the uniformity in order to keep the rules of 
the game to be played in the same way. Consequently, the Court might achieve 
certainty and consistency application of law in terms of procedural context, but 
leaving behind the justice and utility principle of law. It would be appropriate 
here to refer this as the evidence of ‘overruled substance’.
Considering citizenship concept as the starting point, imply that the parties, 
other than Indonesian citizens, would simply have no legal standing before the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court. It could also be drawn that the parties of non-
Indonesian citizens could not have the constitutional loss or injury under the 
Indonesian legal system. This is certainly a deprival of the 1945 Constitution’s 
mandate to provide protection to each person in Indonesian territory. 
Moreover, holding the second element of article 51 (1) (a) in legal standing 
determination would be simply superfluous. The second element, which comprises 
of subjected parties, could not stand as the ratio legis of article 51 (1). Legal 
standing requires what called as constitutional loss. Thus, when the Court argued 
that the second element is rather the substance of article 51 (1), then without 
constitutional loss, the individual Indonesian citizens, customary community 
groups living in accordance with the society development and principles of the 
State of the Republic of Indonesia as provided by the laws, public or private 
legal entities and State institutions should be automatically granted for legal 
standing before the Constitutional Court. If this argument is affirmed, it would 
be breach of the doctrine zonder belang het is geen rechtsingang, reads that 
62  Ibid., 19
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without interest there would be no entry right.63 In any circumstances, it is 
sufficiently reasonable to reject legal standing of an applicant on the basis of 
lacking constitutional loss rather than solely based on the subjected parties. 
Standing, in its origin however, does not stand in the individual Indonesian 
citizens, customary community groups living in accordance with the society 
development and principles of the State of the Republic of Indonesia as provided 
by the laws or even public or private legal entities and State institutions, but it 
lies in each legal subject with possibly constitutional injury by which he/she is 
subjected to the enactment of certain provisions of a statute. A party cannot have 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he is subjected to 
the provisions of that statute.
It is then suggested here that the ratio legis of article 51 (1) should actually 
goes to the first element. When the Court declared that the case was admissible 
for the Indonesian citizens, the Court argued that they have constitutional rights 
afforded by article 28A and article 28I of the 1945 Constitution (non-derogable 
in nature) that have been deprived by the enactment of death penalty under the 
Law of Narcotics, as they were convicted for death penalty and awaiting for its 
execution.64 In this regards, they have legal standing to file judicial review before 
the Constitutional Court. This line of argumentation draws that constitutional 
loss is the basic concept of the application article 51 (1). The Court relied on the 
substance of this article to determine the legal standing of the applicants. It would 
be hard to argue that non-Indonesian citizens’ applicants had no constitutional 
loss. Either Indonesian or non-Indonesian citizens’ applicants questioned the 
same provisions, and all of them were convicted with the death penalty under 
the Narcotics Law. How could be possible to determine applicant legal standing 
but leaving the substance of injury? Meanwhile in order to determine the 
legal standing it should be demonstrated the connection of the injury and the 
enactment of concerned statute. This is what William A Fletcher defined that 
the examination of legal standing depends on the substance of the law.65
63  See Laica Marzuki, “Legal Standing, Sisi Lain Pengujian UU Di MK,” Kompas, 2004, 8 edition.
64 Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 367.
65 Flethcer, “The Structure of Standing,” 290–91.
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Supporting the argument that constitutional loss stands as the actual question 
of legal standing, and therefore decisive in admissibility test, the following case 
might serve to be the evidence. Some seven years later after this case, the Court 
rendered constitutional court judgment No. 137/PUU-XII/2014 reviewing article 
51 (1) of the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning the Constitutional 
Court. There were seven lawyers, all of them were Indonesian citizens, submitted 
judicial review to the Court questioning the constitutionality of article 51 (1). 
They requested for the Court to declare that their client, non-Indonesian citizen, 
should have the right to exercise judicial review. Although the applicants were 
Indonesian citizens, the Court yet declared that the case was inadmissible due to 
‘lacking of sufficient interest’, as stipulated by article 51 (1) and its jurisprudence 
No 006/PUU-III/2005.  The Court found that although they were Indonesian 
citizens who represented non-Indonesian citizens they had no constitutional 
loss, required in article 51 (1) and court jurisprudence No 006/PUU-III/2005. 
Without legal interest or constitution loss, Indonesian citizens’ applicants yet 
declares inadmissible, proving that even subjected parties under article 51 (1) 
does not necessarily determinant in the question of legal standing. Therefore 
the Court would not grant legal standing even to Indonesian citizens when they 
do not have the possible constitutional loss. 
2.2.2 The Due Process of Law
The Court had determined that such inadmissibility decision does not 
necessarily constitute the breach of due process of law principle since the 
applicants were granted the legal remedies of appeal, cassation and review before 
the Supreme Court.66 As a matter of fact, it was true that they were given their rights 
for legal remedies by means appeal and cassation by the time the constitutional 
judgment was delivered. This reasoning, however, preserved error of law. 
The 1945 Constitution, in chapter IX, article 24, 24A, 24B, 24C and 25, stipulate 
the definition of judicial power in Indonesian legal system. Article 24 (1) defines:
(1) The judicial power shall be independent to organize judicial administration in 
order to uphold the law and justice. 
66  Judicial Review Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics against the 1945 Constitution at 367–68.
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Article 24 (2) declared that:
(2) The judicial power shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and its judiciary 
organs within the jurisdiction of public courts, religious court, military court, state 
administration court, and by a Constitutional Court.
The power of Constitutional Court, in the context of due process of law, is 
stipulated under article 24C (1), is read:
(1) The Constitutional Court shall have the authority to adjudicate at the first level 
and last resort of which the decision shall be final in examining the laws towards 
the Constitution, deciding disputes concerning state institutions authorities whose 
are provided by the Constitution, deciding on the dissolution of political parties, 
and deciding disputes concerning election result.
Pursuant to those provisions, in order to uphold the law and justice, judicial 
power is mandated not solely to the Supreme Court, but also to the Constitutional 
Court. It would be then questionable when the Court drawn its conclusion that due 
process of law depends merely on the Supreme Court and its lower proceedings. 
The judicial power, in the context of enforcing the law and seeking for justice, is 
mandated also to the Constitutional Court. It means that Constitutional Court 
serves as one of the forums available to legal subject to sought for justice, more 
specifically for individual, regardless its citizenship or nationality because their 
rights are recognized under the 1945 Constitution. Since they were subjected to 
be prosecuted by the law and proceeded under the Supreme Court judiciary, at 
the same time they should be given their constitutional rights as mandated by 
the 1945 Constitution as the part of due process of law. There would constitute 
a breach of constitutional right if non-Indonesian citizens are lacking the access 
to stand before the Constitutional Court for judicial review. The fact that non-
Indonesian citizens were not granted legal standing to question certain provision 
of the laws, showed that the Court seemed to leave its mandate assigned by 
the 1945 Constitution.
2.3	 Conflict	of	Laws:	The	 Immunity	of	Article	51	 (1)	
This reasoning on the inadmissibility decision serves as precedent in the 
Constitutional Court. Some four years after the judgment No 2-3/PUU—V/2007 
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delivered, the Constitution Court has unanimously rendered a judgment No 73/
PUU-VIII/2010 filed also by non-Indonesian citizen, a Romanian, Popa Nicolae, 
concerning on his arbitrary detention based on article 34 (b), article 35 (1), 
and article 39 (4) of the Indonesian Statute No 1 Year 1979 on Extradition 
and article 51 (1) (a) the Indonesian Statute No 24 Year 2003 concerning The 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court declared the case inadmissible 
since the applicant, Romanian citizen, had no legal standing to file for such 
judicial review. His detention had been prolonged up to six times because the 
extradition law did not mention the maximum time period of the detention.67 
If the ruling of the Constitutional Court is followed, it would be very difficult to 
find Indonesian citizens who have the similar interest as Popa Nicolae in order 
to fulfill the requirements of legal standing for the judicial review.
These two cases,68 along with article 51 (1) judicial review case in 201469, 
amount to immune status of article 51 (1) from judicial review. There would be 
no chance to review the existence of article 51 (1) towards the 1945 Constitution. 
Consequently, non-Indonesian citizens will never be recognized in judicial review 
mechanism before the Indonesian Constitutional Court. In fact, although they 
possibly have constitutional injury, they cannot challenge the statute because 
article 51 (1) does not recognize them as the applicants at the first place. It 
requires to be Indonesian citizens to submit for judicial review. Meanwhile, 
when Indonesian citizens seeks to review article 51 (1) before the Constitutional 
Court they will certainly be declared inadmissible due to simply insufficient 
constitutional loss or injury. In this context, there is no possible entrance to 
review article 51 (1) when at the same time this article is used as the basis for 
legal standing determination by the Court. Article 51 (1) leaves itself immune from 
judicial review before the Court, and this Court decision actually precludes the 
Court from its genuine mandate to examine the laws under the 1945 Constitution. 
67 Judicial Review Number 1 of 1979 on Extradition at 3.
68 “Indonesian Law Number 22 of 1997 on Narcotics” (1997); Judicial Review Number 1 of 1979 on Extradition.
69 Judicial Review Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court as it has been amended into Law Number 8 of 
2011 on the Amendment of Law Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court against the 1945 Constitution. 
It reviews article 51 (1).
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III. CONCLUDING REMARK
The determination to grant legal standing should be based on the 
constitutional loss of the applicant rather than on the subjected parties. The 
Court’s decision in determining non-Indonesian citizens’ legal standing based 
on the expressis verbis of article 51 (1) (a) has abandoned the substance of that 
concerned article, the constitutional loss. This ruling, however, amounts to the 
error application of the 1945 Constitution and culminating to immune status 
of article 51 (1) from judicial review. The genuine mandate of the Court for 
reviewing the laws is then obscured by such determination.
As the judgment of Constitutional Court is final and not subjected for any 
review, there is nothing here to suggest available avenues in order to correct this 
ruling. In forthcoming examinations, perhaps, the judges’ dissenting opinion in 
this case could be invoked to remind the Court for the ratio legis of judicial 
review. 
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